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 In 2008 and 2009, bondholders of ailing companies were affected by a reemergence 
of an important corporate restructuring strategy, known as a Distressed Exchange. 
Fourteen companies in 2008 completed this desperate attempt to avoid a formal bankruptcy 
filing – about twice as many as any single year in the last 25 years, involving twice as much 
in dollar amount than in the entire prior history (1984-2007).  And, in just the first four 
months of 2009, nine firms have already completed distressed exchanges. The recovery rate 
to bondholders participating in distressed exchanges over the last 25 years is significantly 
higher than recoveries on other, more dramatic types of default – namely payment defaults 
and bankruptcies. But, there is no guarantee that a distressed exchange will permanently 
immunize the firm from further distress, with almost 50% of all companies completing 
distressed exchanges prior to 2008 ultimately filing for bankruptcy. 
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The re-emergence of distressed exchanges in corporate restructurings 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The year 2008 saw the prominent reemergence of a classical restructuring mechanism 
known as a distressed-exchange (DE). This tactic is usually an attempt by an ailing firm to avoid 
bankruptcy by proposing a fundamental change in the contractual relationship between a debtor and 
its various creditor classes and is “voluntarily” agreed upon by a sufficient percentage (usually 90% 
or more) of relevant creditor claims. While one of the most common and dramatic DE involves a 
substitution of lower priority equity securities for debt claims, DEs can also result from a reduction 
of the effective interest rate on the debt, a subordination of claims, an extension of time to repay the 
debt or a package of new securities, cash and other securities, that have a total value that is less than 
the face value of the original debt claim.  Another critical component is the condition that the 
original claim is selling at a distressed price at the time of the DE announcement, usually below 70 
cents on the US dollar. The resulting situation is still called a DE even if the price of the existing 
debt increases after the announcement. 
The first instances of DEs in the modern high-yield bond era were the so-called  3(a)9 
exchange championed by Drexel Burnham Lambert in the 1980s. These exchanges were 
particularly attractive to the distressed firms because they did not require Securities and Exchange 
Commission review and could be accomplished quickly, usually in less than a month. A second 
critical element was that the exchange was tax-free, even if the new securities had a combined value 
of less than the original claim. This tax-free exemption changed in the early 1990s when the 
reduction in debt was considered a taxable event. This revised tax ruling is still in effect, regardless 
of whether the company is in a distressed condition. Hence, there is little incentive for a highly 
solvent firm to exchange its debt for equity and reduce its leverage when the consequence would be 
a meaningful increase in taxes. As such, these exchanges will usually only take place when a firm is 
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desperately trying to avoid an even more costly bankruptcy, and also usually where it has sufficient 
tax-loss credits to offset the taxable exchange.  
In a preliminary discussion of DEs (Altman & Karlin, 2009), it was proposed that it was 
time to revisit this tax ruling, since the deleveraging of corporate America is a meaningful objective.  
Very soon after, we learned that the economic stimulus legislation that passed Congress in February 
2009 contained important relief for companies seeking to restructure debt by deferring most 
cancellation of debt “income” in 2009 and 2010 until 2014 then amortizing over a five-year period 
from 2014-2018.  For a more detailed description of this new legislation, including whether it may 
pay for a company to take advantage of this tax deferral while in bankruptcy, see Kirkland and Ellis 
(2009). 
While a few earlier studies such as, for example, Gilson et al (1990) showed that out-of-
court restructurings were considerably less costly than bankruptcies to the debtor firm, in many 
cases the DE was followed by a bankruptcy anyway. Our own results, discussed below, show that 
out of 57 DEs completed prior to 2008 at least 26 (46%) were followed by a bankruptcy filing, and 
the majority of others resulted in a change of ownership of the debtor (ie, were acquired). 
2  IMPLIMCATIONS of DISTRESSED EXCHANGES 
Distressed exchanges  have important implications for credit markets.  Firstly, just about all 
instances of DEs are now categorized as a “default” in the calculations of default rates, including in 
our own calculations. There is still some debate, however, as to whether the entire debt issue 
involved in a DE should be counted as a default or only the actual amount tendered in the exchange. 
Another debatable issue is over what date the debt should be considered in default: when the DE is 
announced or when it is completed. This is particularly relevant for the computation of the recovery 
rate of the default event. The policy is to count a DE that has been accepted by the requisite 
proportion of claimants at the time the announcement of the tender offer took place, unless there 
were changes in the terms of the exchange or other material events took place, as in the case of 
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GMAC (discussed below). In addition, we only count the face value amount of claims that are 
tendered, not the total outstanding amount of the debt issue. 
3  DISTRESSED EXCHANGE DEFAULTS IN THE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP 
MARKET 
 
An important consequence of a completed DE had been that it was possible, but not 
likely, that it would trigger a default event in the credit default swap (CDS) market.  This is 
known as a modified restructuring (MOD-R) default.  Ever since this market began developing in 
the late 1990s, there has been a recurring ambiguity over whether a DE or other significant 
negative firm development would trigger a default and unwinding of the transaction. Evolving 
formalization of CDS contracts by International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) have 
reduced these controversies and resulted in certain guidelines.  Furthermore, as of April 2009, 
DEs were no longer considered a default event, eliminating one possible negative event that could  
constitute a default and trigger a payout.  This change constitutes a reduction in the insurance 
potential of a CDS hedging contract. 
In the past, triggers for DEs that changed the terms of existing debt included an equity for 
debt swap, a drop in coupon, extension of maturity or creation of contractual subordination, but 
only if it is within the context of the existing bond or loan (ie, if it has the same Committee on 
Uniform Security Identification Procedures CUSIP) security identifier. It is in a form that binds 
all holders of the obligation and it is “voluntary” in that only investors who accept and tender 
their bonds are subject to what the issuer proposes.  Hence, there was no default event even if 
those not accepting had their priority subordinated vis-à-vis those accepting (ISDA, 2003).  In the 
case of the GMAC in 2008, where less than 60%  of the par value amount of the issue were 
bound by the exchange, a CDS default was not triggered. The same was true in all of the 2008 
DEs. The corporate market has not experienced any distressed exchanges that triggered a default 
in the CDS market in recent years, although it has been observed in the sovereign market (eg, 
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Argentina). Outside of a prepackaged Chapter 11, US corporations have found it extremely 
difficult to affect an exchange which would qualify as a default under ISDA guidelines.  As noted 
above, a proposal to eliminate a “modified exchange” as a default trigger in CDS contracts was 
adopted in order to avoid confusion and costly lawsuits.  Therefore, only a failure to pay interest 
or a bankruptcy will qualify after March 2009. 
The distinction between a default in the primary market (and what investors believe will 
be their ultimate recovery) and what triggers a payout in the CDS market helps to explain why 
CDS spreads have recently been tighter for many distressed credits than CDS spreads in the bond 
market. Other reasons for tighter spreads are liquidity and funding differences, but it is difficult to 
isolate each factor. 
4  DISTRESSED EXCHANGES IN 2008 
To say that a resurgence in the incidence of DEs was observed in 2008 is a gross 
understatement.  Indeed, the number of DEs in 2008 (14) was almost double the number for any 
year since 1984 (see Table 1).  The total amount of DEs ($30.3 billion) was more than twice the 
total amount from the years 1984-2007 combined.  Firms appear to be scrambling to avoid 
bankruptcy like never before, and due to their significant tax-loss credits, they are not concerned 
about the taxable nature of the debt reductions.1 In addition, since debtor-in-possession (DIP) loans 
and equity infusions are constrained due to the credit crisis, the usual benefits of bankruptcy have 
been lessened and the prospect of liquidation in bankruptcy has heightened.  Creditors, on the other 
hand, are less likely to resist a DE tender because the likely recovery after a DE is greater than 
either in bankruptcy reorganization or in liquidation.  Of course, initial DE proposals can be 
challenged by creditors in the hope that the debtor will sweeten the offer.  Several instances of this 
                                                     
1
 Debt forgiveness which gives rise to income may be offset by net operative losses (NOLs) in an out-of-court restructuring.  In a bankruptcy, debt 
forgiveness is generally excluded from income regardless if any NOLs are relevant, but at the end of the year, the debtor must still generally reduce any 
available favorable tax attributes by the amount of the excluded debt forgiveness.  The same tax treatment may be accomplished out of bankruptcy if the 
debtor is deemed to be “insolvent” immediately before the debt forgiveness – the amount is limited to the amount of insolvency.  New legislation, 
however, defers any taxes regarding certain debt forgiveness income incurred in 2009 and 2010. 
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occurred in 2008, the most publicized of which was the recently completed GMAC exchange. If the 
DE goes through despite some proportion that is not tendered, those not tendering will continue to 
have a claim of full face value should a bankruptcy subsequently occur subsequently. 
The saga of the 2008 GMAC/Residential Capital exchange has been exceptional for several 
reasons. It involved the US government in a material way and it is by far the largest DE in history. 
The initial DE offer was a complicated package of cash, new debt and preferred stock that was 
advertised as needing a tender of at least 75% of the outstanding debt amounts of both GMAC and 
Residential Capital, a subsidiary of GMAC. The 75% was the amount supposedly necessary for the 
Federal Reserve to grant GMAC status as a bank holding company, thereby giving it access to the 
FED’s discount window and its low-cost debt borrowings.  
It appeared that the 75% was not going to be achieved, although the bank holding company 
status was formally announced subject to the requisite amount of new equity capital being raised, 
ostensibly in the equity for debt swap from the DE. When it became obvious that the 75% was not 
going to be achieved, the US government trumped that requirement by investing US$5 billion 
directly in preferred stock of GMAC and loaning an additional US$1 billion to GM for the purpose 
of that firm’s purchase of additional preferred securities. Hence, the 75% exchange was not 
necessary and GMAC accepted the 59% of GMAC bonds tendered as well as the 39% tendered to 
Residential Capital.  De facto, the usual 90% requirement, or even the 75% stated in the objective, 
was not relevant and the DE was achieved.  
The irony of the GMAC DE is that all creditors (both those that tendered and those that did 
not) were pleased with the exchange since the prices on all existing bonds spiked significantly due 
to the government’s enormous equity “bailout” infusion.  The upfront premium on the CDS of the 
remaining GMAC bonds also dropped dramatically from about 44% as of the day before the firm 
won Federal Reserve approval (actually the equity infusion) to become a bank holding company, to 
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about 10.5% on January 2, 2009.  Most of the drop occurred after the announced equity infusion on 
December 29, 2008. Bond prices increased by about 30 points after that announcement. 
Distressed Exchanges in 2008 amounted to about 21% of the defaulted issuers (13 of 63) 
but as much as 59% of the dollar amount (in US dollars) of defaults2.  These statistics attest to the 
domination of 2008 in the DE phenomenon.  For the period 1984-2008, however, DEs only 
accounted for about 7.2% of all defaulting issuers and 10.0% of all default dollar amounts (see 
Table 1 on page 5). 
  
                                                     
2
  For a detailed report on defaults in 2008,  please see Altman & Karlin (2009),  
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TABLE 1. High-yield bond distressed exchange default and recovery statistics, 1984 through 5/8/09 
Year 
D/E 
Defaults 
($) 
Total 
Defaults 
($) 
% D/E 
Defaults 
to 
Total $ 
D/E 
Defaults 
(# Issuers) 
Total 
Defaults 
(# Issuers) 
% D/E 
Defaults to 
Total 
# Issuers 
D/E 
Recovery 
Ratea (%) 
All Default 
Recovery 
Ratea (%) 
Difference 
Between D/E 
& All Default 
Recovery 
Rate (%) 
2009(5/8) 13,455.72 59,092.23 22.8% 9 45 20.0 25.03 24.19 0.83 
2008 30,329.42 50,763.26 59.7 14 64 29.9 52.41 42.50 9.91 
2007 146.83 5,473.00 2.7 1 19 5.3 85.17 66.65 18.52 
2006 0.00 7,559.00 0.0 0 0 0 n/a n/a n/a 
2005 6861.00 36,209.00 18.0 1 34 2.9 78.61 62.96 15.65 
2004 537.88 11,657.00 4.6 5 39 12.8 58.05 57.72 0.33 
2003 1,080.92 38,451.00 2.8 8 86 9.3 78.52 45.58 32.94 
2002 764.80 96,858.00 0.8 3 112 2.7 61.22 25.30 35.92 
2001 1,267.60 63,609.00 2.0 5 156 3.2 33.12 25.62 7.50 
2000 50.00 30,295.00 0.2 1 107 0.9 77.00 26.74 50.26 
1999 2,118.40 23,532.00 9.0 6 98 6.1 65.39 27.90 37.49 
1998 461.10 7,464.00 6.2 2 37 5.4 17.34 40.46 (23.12) 
1997 0.00 4,200.00 0.0 0 0 0.0 n/a n/a n/a 
1996 0.00 3,336.00 0.0 0 0 0.0 n/a n/a n/a 
1995 0.00 4,551.00 0.0 0 0 0.0 n/a n/a n/a 
1994 0.00 3,418.00 0.0 0 0 0.0 n/a n/a n/a 
1993 0.00 2,287.00 0.0 0 0 0.0 n/a n/a n/a 
1992 0.00 5,545.00 0.0 0 0 0.0 n/a n/a n/a 
1991 76.00 18,862.00 0.4 1 62 1.6 31.30 40.67 (9.37) 
1990 1,044.00 18,354.00 5.7 7 47 14.9 43.15 24.66 18.49 
1989 548.90 8,110.00 6.8 6 26 23.1 44.53 35.97 8.56 
1988 390.30 3,944.00 9.9 3 24 12.5 28.40 43.45 (15.05) 
1987 33.60 7,486.00 0.4 2 15 13.3 40.70 66.63 (25.93) 
1986 114.80 3,156.00 3.6 3 23 13.0 47.68 36.60 11.08 
1985 323.30 992.00 32.6 2 19 10.5 55.04 41.78 13.26 
1984 100.10 344.00 29.1 1 12 8.3 44.12 50.62 (6.50) 
Totals/ 
Averages $59,703.86 $515,547.50 11.6% 80 1025 7.8% 50.88b 41.37b 9.51 
a Weighted-average recovery rates for each year. 
b Arithmetic average of the weighted-average annual recovery rates; only those years with DEs counted. The arithmetic average of each 
individual DE (70) for the entire sample period was 46.52% and the average for the non-DE defaults (875 observations) was 37.25%. 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation from the NYU Salomon Center Master Default Database 
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5  RECOVERY RATES ON DISTRESSED  EXCHANGES 
Since DEs are not as dramatic a testimony to the firm’s distressed status as to a bankruptcy 
or non-payment of cash interest on the debt, one might expect that the recovery rate on DE defaults 
will be higher than other, more serious distressed situations. Indeed, the data backs this up. Table 1 
on pages 5/6 shows that the arithmetic average recovery rate on all DE defaults was 50.88% for the 
period 1984-2009 compared to 42.32% for all defaults and 37.3% for all non-DE defaults (see 
Table 2 on the next page). In 2008 alone, DEs recovered 52.2% while non-DE defaults recovered 
only 27.1%. 
In Table 2 on the next page, we calculate a difference in means test between the arithmetic 
average recovery rate (49.1%)3 on the 70 DEs over the period 1984-2008  compared to the average 
recovery rate on all non-DE defaults (37.3%) over the same period. We find that given the above, 
the DE recovery rate is significantly higher (t = 5.76) at the 1% confidence level. It is not surprising 
that bondholders will choose, in many instances, to accept a recovery with certainty from a DE 
rather than take the chance of holding out for an uncertain, and probably lower, recovery in 
bankruptcy. Our results do not include data for situations when a DE offer is rejected. It is safe to 
assume, however, that most of these scenarios would be associated with a subsequent bankruptcy 
petition. Investors still must decide, given the completion of a DE, whether to hold on to the new set 
of securities from the exchange or to sell as quickly as is feasible. It can safely be said that if a 
bankruptcy takes place subsequent to a DE, then the default recovery after bankruptcy will be 
considerably lower than it would have been had the investor sold immediately after the DE, perhaps 
by about 20%. What is not known is the likely positive average return on those situations when a 
bankruptcy is permanently avoided after the DE. 
 
                                                     
3
 The average of the annual weighted average DE recovery rates was 50.9% (see Table 1 on page 6). 
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TABLE 2. Difference in Means Test Between Recovery Rates: All Non-Distressed Exchange 
Defaulting Issuers versus Distressed Exchanges (D/E), 1984-2008 
 All Defaults Excluding D/E Distressed Exchanges 
Sample Size 2060 147 
Mean Recovery Rate 37.25 49.11 
Standard Deviation 25.66 24.01 
Variance 658.44 576.38 
t-testa 5.75836  
a 
  
Source: Authors’ compilation from NYU Salomon Center Master Default Database 
 
 
6  Subsequent Performance of DE Firms 
An important follow-on question to the DE restructuring strategy is over the subsequent 
performance of the firm and its securities.  This has been assessed this by tracking the firms 
which completed a DE prior to 2008,4 separating them into several categories as of March 2009, 
including still operating, acquired and  bankrupt (Chapter 7 or 11).  Obviously, a DE that results 
in a subsequent bankruptcy proved to be an unsuccessful restructuring, and the DE merely 
delayed the eventual demise of the firm. 
The subsequent fate of 57 DEs is listed in Appendix A.  Of the 57, 26 (45.6 %) 
eventually went bankrupt (20 Chapter 11 reorganizations and 6 Chapter 7 liquidations).  The time 
from the completion of the DE to bankruptcy ranged from less than one month to 18 years, with 
the median being about 2 years.  Seventeen (30.0 %) DE firms were eventually acquired, while 
11(19.3 %) were still operating in 2009.  We could not find subsequent data on three firms.  In 
conclusion, almost half of our DE sample declared bankruptcy subsequent to the exchange and 
the remaining are still operating as a going concern in one form or another in 2009. 
                                                     
4
 The 14 DE firms in 2008 have not been tracked because their DE is too recent to assess with regard to their ultimate fate. 
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7  The Trend of DEs Distressed Exchanges 
We expect DEs to continue without abatement in 2009 due to the sheer record number of 
distressed companies as well as changes in the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 that made it more 
difficult to reorganize successfully (ie, to emerge as a going concern at the end of the 
reorganization process).  As noted earlier, we observed an unprecedented appetite in 2008 to 
restructure out-of-court rather than risk bankruptcy and liquidation.5  No doubt, the difficulty in 
raising debtor-in-possession loans and exit-financing influenced the decision to file for 
bankruptcy.  Indeed, prior to 2008, our statistics (Altman and Hotchkiss (2005) found that as 
much as 60-65% of large Chapter 11s in the 20 years prior to 2008 were successful in emerging 
from the bankruptcy process as a “going concern,” although a non-significant number (about 200) 
ultimately filed again (Altman et al (2009)). 
In addition to the lack of Chapter 11 financing of late, the new Bankruptcy Code of 2005 
clearly has tilted the negotiating process toward favoring creditors.  As Miller (2009) pointed out, 
creditors had strong lobbyists arguing their point of view in the discussions leading up to the new 
Code while debtors did not.  Leases are now more difficult to reject and certain claims, such as, 
for examples, swaps and securities, are now exempt from the “automatic stay.”  Additionally, 
creditors can now wait for the exclusivity period to run out after 20 (18+2) months and then 
propose their own reorganization plan.  All of these factors encourage debtors to try to restructure 
out of court hence the expected strong showing of DEs in 2009 and 2010, years when one can 
expect pressures on many companies to be severe, and the new legislative ruling that any taxes on 
the reduction of debt can be deferred. 
 
                                                     
5
 In 2008 and through February 2009, there were 22 Chapter 11s that were converted to Chapter 7 liquidations (New Generation Research, 2009), 
approximately 10% of all large (greater than $100 million in liabilities) Chapter 11 filings in the three-year period 2006-2008. 
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8  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study is to highlight the re-emergence of a type of distressed 
restructuring strategy known as a distressed exchange.  The combination of an elevated fear of 
liquidations in bankruptcy, sizeable net operating losses to offset debt forgiveness taxes, and 
increased aggressiveness on the part of corporate advisors has motivated a significant increase in 
DE activity in 2008 and also in the first quarter of 2009.  Indeed, DEs in 2008 is about twice the 
number of any year in the past and the over US$30 billion in debt forgiveness this past year is 
about twice the total amount in all of the prior years in our sample period (1984-2007) combined.  
Stay tuned, since we expect the trend in DEs in the near future to equal or actually exceed the 
high number and amount in 2008. 
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Appendix A 
Subsequent Development of Distressed Exchanges (1984 – 2007) 
 
This Table shows the subsequent performance of 57 firms that went 
through a Distressed Exchange prior to 2008 
 
Issuer Name Distressed 
Exchange 
Date 
Exchange Type 
(Debt exchanged 
to _________ ) 
Subsequent 
Development 
Bankruptcy Date 
(if Applicable) 
Years from 
Distressed 
Exchange to 
Bankruptcy 
 
@Track 
Communications 
2/15/2001 Debt Chapter 11 2/2/2004 3.00 
      
Abraxas Petroleum 
Corp. 
11/1/1999 Debt Still Operating NA NA 
 
Advantica Restaurant 
Group, Inc. 
 
3/1/2002 
 
Debt 
 
Still Operating 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
After Six, Inc. 
 
8/28/1989 
 
Undetermined 
 
Chapter 7 
 
2/26/199 
 
 
3.50 
Aircoa Hospitality 
Services 
9/15/1990 Cash Acquired NA NA 
      
Alamosa Holdings, Inc. 9/12/2003 Debt/Equity Acquired NA NA 
      
Alpine Group 9/14/1989 Debt/Equity Still Operating 
 
NA NA 
American Cellular 
Corp. 
7/15/2003 Equity/Cash Acquired NA NA 
      
American Telecasting, 
Inc. 
5/13/1998 Debt Acquired NA NA 
 
AMF Bowling 
Worldwide, Inc. 
 
6/28/1999 
 
Cash 
 
Chapter 11 
 
7/3/2001 
 
2.08 
      
Anchor Advanced 
Products, Inc. (Moll 
Industries) 
8/8/2000 Debt Acquired - 
Subsequent 
Chapter 11 
9/19/2002 2.08 
      
Charter 
Communication 
8/24/2005 Debt Chapter 11 3/27/2009 3.67 
      
Continental Global 
Group, Inc. 
 
10/4/2004 Debt Acquired NA NA 
Dailey International, 
Inc. 
5/21/1999 Equity Chapter 11 5/28/1999 0.02 
      
Darling Delaware Co. 9/15/1990 Debt/Equity Still Operating NA NA 
      
Dart Drug Stores, Inc. 7/1/1987 Debt/Equity Chapter 7 8/10/1989 2.08 
      
Focal  
Communications Corp.  
10/31/2001 Equity Chapter 11 12/19/2002 1.17 
      
Forstmann & Co. 8/14/1990 Debt Chapter 11 9/22/1995 5.08 
      
Foster Wheeler Ltd. 9/22/2004 Equity Still Operating NA NA 
      
G & G Retail, Inc. 3/18/2004 Equity Chapter 11 1/15/2006 1.83 
      
Gaylord Container 
Corp. 
 
3/4/2002 Debt Acquired NA NA 
General Defense Corp. 
 
2/1/1988 Equity/Cash Acquired NA NA 
Golden Ocean Group 
Ltd. 
9/20/1999 Equity Chapter 11 1/14/2000 0.33 
      
Hall-mark Electronics 
Corp. 
3/1/1990 Debt Acquired NA NA 
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Appendix A 
(continued) 
 
     
Harborside Healthcare 
Corp.  
4/6/2001 Debt Acquired NA NA 
      
Heafner Tire Group, 
Inc. 
3/26/2002 Cash Acquired NA NA 
      
Home Group Funding, 
Inc. 
1/15/1991 Debt Acquired NA NA 
      
International Controls 
Corp. 
6/15/1990 Undetermined Cannot find 
information 
NA NA 
      
Iron Age Holdings 
Corp. 
12/2/2003 Cash Chapter 7 1/22/2007 3.08 
      
J. Crew Group, Inc.  5/8/2003 Debt Still Operating NA NA 
      
JL French Automotive 
Castings, Inc. 
8/24/2004 Equity Chapter 11 2/10/2006 1.50 
      
Jordan Industries, Inc. 2/24/2004 Debt Still Operating NA NA 
      
Kane Industries, Inc. 1/1/1990 Debt/Cash Chapter 11 3/18/1994 4.17 
      
Kenai Corp 10/15/1984 Equity Cannot find 
information 
NA NA 
Metropolitan 
Broadcasting 
 
10/12/1989 Debt/Cash NA NA NA 
 
Miramar Marine Corp. 12/5/1989 Undetermined Chapter 11 4/15/1991 1.33 
      
Na-Churs Plant Food 5/1/1986 Undetermined Still Operating NA NA 
      
New World Pictures, 
Inc. 
8/12/1988 Undetermined Acquired NA NA 
      
North Atlantic Holding 
Co. 
 
5/9/2007 Debt Still Operating NA NA 
NTEX, Inc. 5/17/2001 Equity Still Operating NA NA 
      
Oak Industries 3/29/1985 Debt/Equity Acquired NA NA 
      
Ponderosa, Inc. 12/6/1989 Undetermined Acquired - 
Subsequent 
Chapter 11 
10/22/2008 18.83 
Roma Restaurant 
Holdings, Inc. –  
Romacorp Inc. 
 
7/1/2003 Debt/Cash Chapter 11 11/6/2005 2.33 
Savin Corp 2/1/1986 Debt/Equity Chapter 11 and 
subsequently 
acquired 
 
12/14/1993 7.83 
Service Control Corp. 7/15/1989 Undetermined Acquired NA NA 
      
Specialty Foods 
Acquisition Corp. 
6/10/1999 Debt Chapter 11 9/18/2000 1.25 
      
Sunbeam Corp. 2/1/1988 Undetermined Chapter 11 2/20/1988 0.05 
      
Telesystem 
International Wireless, 
Inc. 
7/6/2001 Debt/Cash Chapter 7 NA NA 
      
Texas International Co. 8/22/1985 Undetermined Chapter 11 4/26/1988 2.67 
      
Tultex Corp. 5/13/1999 Debt/Cash Chapter 7 12/3/1999 0.58 
      
      
UbiquiTel, Inc. 2/21/2003 Debt/Cash Acquired NA NA 
      
Univision Holdings, 
Inc. 
2/1/1990 Cash Acquired NA NA 
      
Western Union 
Telegraph Co. 
11/1/1987 Debt/Cash Chapter 11 2/4/1993 5.25 
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Appendix A 
(continued) 
 
     
Wickes, Inc. 2/27/2003 Debt Chapter 7 1/20/2004 0.92 
      
Wilshire Financial 
Services Group, Inc. 
 
11/13/1998 Equity Chapter 11 3/3/1999 0.33 
XM Satellite Radio, Inc. 
 
1/28/2003 Debt Acquired NA NA 
Zapata Corp 
 
                   
11/1/1986 Cash Still Operating NA NA 
 
Summary Information 
Exchange Type Subsequent Development Years from Distressed Exchange to Bankruptcy 
Debt 18 Bankruptcy – Chapter 7 6 Count 57 
Cash 6  Bankruptcy – Chapter 11 18  Mean 3 
Equity 9  Acquired 17  Median 2.08 
Debt/Equity 6  Still Operating 11  Maximum 18.83 
Debt /Cash 7  Acquired – Subsequent Chapter 11 2  Minimum 0.02 
Equity/Cash 2  Other 3    
Undetermined 9       
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Subsequent Development of Distressed Exchanges (2008 – 2009) 
 
This Table shows the subsequent performance of 22 firms that went 
through a Distressed Exchange after 2007 
 
Issuer Name Distressed 
Exchange 
Date 
Exchange Type 
(Debt exchanged 
to _________ ) 
Subsequent 
Development 
Bankruptcy Date 
(if Applicable) 
Years from 
Distressed 
Exchange to 
Bankruptcy 
 
Ainsworth Lumber Co., 
Ltd. 
7/29/2008 Debt/Equity Still Operating NA NA 
      
American Achievement 
Group Holding Corp. 
2/25/2009 Debt Still Operating NA NA 
      
Clear Channel 
Communications 
12/23/2008 Debt Still Operating NA NA 
      
Clear Channel 
Communications, Inc. 
12/23/2008 Debt Still Operating NA NA 
      
CMP Susquehanna 
Corp. 
4/3/2009 Debt/Equity 
(Preferred & 
warrants) 
Still Operating NA NA 
      
Finlay Fine Jewelry 
Corp. 
11/25/2008 Debt Still Operating NA NA 
      
Ford Motor Co. 4/3/2009 Debt/Cash Still Operating NA NA 
      
Freescale 
Semiconductor, Inc. 
3/10/2009 Debt Still Operating NA NA 
      
GMAC, LLC 12/29/2008 Debt, Cash and 
Equity (Preferred)  
Still Operating NA NA 
      
Harrah's Operating Co., 
Inc. 
4/8/2009 Debt/Cash Still Operating NA NA 
      
Harrah's Operating Co., 
Inc. 
12/19/2008 Debt/Cash Still Operating NA NA 
      
Hovnanian Enterprises, 
Inc. 
11/24/2008 Debt Still Operating NA NA 
      
Intelsat Ltd. 2/12/2009 Cash Still Operating NA NA 
      
Metaldyne Corp. 11/26/2008 Cash Chapter 11 5/27/2009 0.50 
      
Neff Corp. 12/16/2008 Debt Still Operating NA NA 
      
NXP B.V. 3/30/2009 Debt Still Operating NA NA 
      
OSI Restaurant 
Partners, LLC 
3/20/2009 Cash Still Operating NA NA 
      
Primus 
Telecommunications 
Group, Inc. 
5/22/2008 Debt/Cash Chapter 11 3/16/2009 0.83 
      
R.H. Donnelley Corp. 6/20/2008 Debt Chapter 11 5/28/2009 0.92 
      
Residential Capital, LLC 6/4/2009 Debt /Cash Still Operating NA NA 
      
Sensata Technologies 
B.V. 
3/30/2009 Cash Still Operating NA NA 
      
Six Flags, Inc. 6/11/2008 Debt Still Operating NA NA 
      
Tekni-Plex, Inc. 6/2/2008 Equity Still Operating NA NA 
      
Sensata Technologies 
B.V. 
3/30/2009 Cash Still Operating NA NA 
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Summary Information 
Exchange Type  Subsequent Development Years from Distressed Exchange to Bankruptcy 
Debt 10  Bankruptcy – Chapter 11 3 Count 23 
Cash 4  Still Operating 20  Mean 0.75 
Equity 1     Median 0.83 
Debt/Equity 2     Maximum 0.92 
Debt /Cash 5     Minimum 0.50 
Debt/Equity/Cash 1       
 
 
Summary Information (1984 – 2009) 
Exchange Type  Subsequent Development Years from Distressed Exchange to Bankruptcy 
Debt 28  Bankruptcy – Chapter 7 6 Count 80 
Cash 10  Bankruptcy – Chapter 11 21  Mean 2.76 
Equity 10  Acquired 17  Median 1.96 
Debt/Equity 8  Still Operating 31  Maximum 18.83 
Debt /Cash 12  Acquired – Subsequent Chapter 
11 
2  Minimum 0.02 
Equity/Cash 2  Other 3    
Debt/Equity/Cash 1       
Undetermined 9       
 
  
